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Reciprocity and Reputation: A Review of Direct and 
Indirect Social Information Gathering
Yvan I. Russell 
University of Göttingen and Middlesex University
Direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, and reputation are important interrelated topics in the 
evolution of sociality. This non-mathematical review is a summary of each. Direct reciprocity 
(the positive kind) has a straightforward structure (e.g., “A rewards B, then B rewards A”) but 
the allocation might differ from the process that enabled it (e.g., whether it is true reciprocity 
or some form of mutualism). Indirect reciprocity (the positive kind) occurs when person (B) 
is rewarded by a third party (A) after doing a good deed towards somebody else (C) — with 
the structure “A observes B help C, therefore A helps B.” Here too, the allocation differs from 
the process: if there is underlying cognition, then indirect reciprocity is based on some ability 
to keep track of the reputations of others (to remember that “B helped C”). Reputation is 
a kind of social impression based on typicality, derived from three channels of experience 
(direct encounters, bystander observation, and gossip). Although non-human animals 
cannot gossip verbally, they can eavesdrop on third parties and learn vicariously. This paper 
ends with a proposal to investigate the topic of social expertise as a model for understanding 
how animals understand and utilise observed information within their social groups.
Keywords: reputation, reciprocity, cooperation, expertise
Reputation as an Animal Concept
 In our daily lives, we often cogitate on matters of gossip and reputation. People 
get upset over a bad reputation. This was humorously illustrated in Anton Chek hov’s 
1883 short story “A Slander” (“Клевета”), whereupon a prestigious school master, 
attending his daughter’s wedding, smacks his lips in approval of some de licious 
food prepared in the kitchen — and then later is obsessively chagrined after discov-
ering that his innocent lip-smacking noise was heard by someone in an ad joining 
room, leading to a widespread rumour that he was adulterously kissing the female 
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cook who was in the same room when he made the noise (Chekhov, 1883/1921). 
Stories like this illustrate “gossip” as a pejorative term, something that might un-
justly cause embarrassment and suffering. 
However, we can use the word “gossip” in a non-pejorative sense too: simply 
as a mechanism of social information exchange. Most human conversations are 
dominated by social gossip, which suggests that gossip has important functions 
(Dunbar, 2004). Gossip “allows individuals and communities to accumulate be-
havioural evidence about others and to form and refine judgements about their 
vices and virtues” (Emler, 1994, p. 133). In other words, gossip gives us important 
information. If a person has a bad reputation, then one might be inclined to avoid 
that person (lest one suffer the way that others have suffered). If a person has a 
good reputation, then one might be inclined to approach that person (to benefit 
the way that others have benefited). If you know nothing about a person’s reputa-
tion, then you approach that person as a blank slate with no predictive informa-
tion on whether you will encounter positive, neutral, or negative consequences. If 
the stakes are high, then it is useful to take advantage of information gathered by 
others. Here, we can bring in a biological concept: the producer–scrounger eff ect, 
where the thief (scrounger) takes advantage of the “behavioural investment of an-
other (producer) to obtain a limited resource” (Barnard and Sibly, 1981, p. 543). 
Usually, this concept is applied to phenomena such as kleptoparisitism (steal ing 
food from one who made the — perhaps risky — effort to acquire the food; this 
is a low-effort way to obtain food, and a loss for the other, e.g., Spencer, Russell, 
Dickins, and Dickins, 2017). We can apply the concept of producer–scrounger to 
social information gathering, where the “limited resource” is information. Imag-
ine that you need information that will help decide whether to approach a man 
called Mr. Enemy. Imagine further that you witnessed Mr. Enemy injuring Mr. 
Friend. Here, Mr. Friend made the — perhaps risky — effort to “produce” infor-
mation for you. By “scrounging” information produced by Mr. Friend (seeing 
him get in jured), you have gained valuable information (that you should perhaps 
avoid Mr. Enemy) whilst avoiding personal injury yourself. There is an advantage 
to gather ing information by proxy. The cognitive mechanism here is analogical 
reasoning: “if Mr. Enemy hurt Mr. Friend, then he will probably hurt me too.” I 
return to the topic of “if–then” social reasoning (de Waal, 2003) later. 
Like others before me (e.g., Dunbar, 2004), I am interested in gossip and rep-
utation in an evolutionary context. I view it as important to adapt the concept of 
reputation in such a way as to accommodate the capabilities of the whole animal 
kingdom (Russell, 2007). The word “reputation” is normally used to describe an 
exclusively human activity: “person A gives testimony about person B to per-
son C, teaching C something new about B.” In everyday colloquial usage, “rep-
utation” refers to this transitivity: information verbally passing along the gossip 
network from one person to another. Language is the crucial ingredient of this 
kind of information flow, and without it, information does not flow past those 
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who perceived the signals first-hand. Verbal information becomes highly advan-
tageous for cooperation when the size of a social group exceeds the point where 
an individual can rely on first-hand knowledge (see Greif, 1989, for an historical 
example). A good reputation is beneficial. As Alexander (1987, p. 95) wrote: “The 
concept of status implies that an individual’s privileges, or its access to resources, 
are controlled in part by how others collectively think of him (hence, treat him) as 
a result of past interactions (including observations of interactions with others).” 
With this advantage in mind, it makes sense that people are motivated to behave 
well when they know they are being watched (Emler, 1990; Engelmann and Fisch-
bacher, 2009). To adapt the concept of reputation for non-human animals, I start 
by recognising that reputation involves more than language. Information about 
others can be also gained from sheer observation (well within the capabilities of 
animals). Therefore, I have previously (Russell, 2007; Russell, Call, and Dunbar, 
2008) defined reputation in an animal-inclusive manner as knowledge about an in­
dividual’s typical behaviour based on a knowledge of that individual’s past behaviour. 
In many situations, the word “individual” can be replaced with “entity,” be-
cause people routinely assign reputations to groups of individuals (even whole 
nations), corporate entities in the business world, or even insentient objects and 
phenomena. The attribution of reputations to groups is in several ways a par-
allel (but not identical) process to the attribution of stereotypes (cf. McGarty, 
2002 and Spears, 2011). Reputation has been defined in many diverse ways by a 
large number of different researchers (e.g., see the reputation model developed 
for the business world by Carmeli and Tishler, 2005, who define reputation as 
the external perception of a business in terms of distinctiveness and prestige). 
The word “reputation” itself (like many words) can seem semantically opaque 
about its actual referent. It is not really a concrete “thing,” but rather it is infor-
mation which somehow has a life of its own beyond individual brains. Here, I 
focus on individual reputations. Reputations are not an inherent property of an 
individual, but are subjective attributions made by others (Obreiter, Fähnrich, 
and Gianluca, 2005; Pollock and Dugatkin, 1992). Among non-human animals, 
reputation can only exist completely outside the sphere of language. Animals 
respond deftly to motivational cues and signals from other animals (Krebs 
and Dawkins, 1984; Smith and Harper, 2004), but reputation is relevant only 
if knowledge about a particular individual’s past behaviour is remembered and 
influences current behaviour towards that individual. Animals may learn the 
typical behaviour of others in three ways (Smith and Harper, 2004): (1) direct 
reputation (personal encounters), (2) indirect reputation (observing events as 
uninvolved bystander), and (3) reported reputation (gossip) [cf; Ostrom, 2003, 
pp. 43-44]. Whilst verbal gossip is surely uniquely human, the other channels of 
information (direct reputation and indirect reputation) are usable by animals 
to varying extents (depending on the species and its cognitive abilities; see 
discus sion in Russell, 2007).
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The actual content of human gossip varies widely. In humans, it is often about 
personality traits (such as Chekhov’s unfortunate schoolmaster being labelled 
an adulterer) or about episodes that lead to personality attributions (that same 
schoolmaster being heard to make a kissing sound). Social psychological re search 
on the topic of reputation has tended to focus on information related to per-
sonality attributes (Emler, 1990). In order to apply the concept of reputation to 
animals, we need to focus on more basic behaviour. Below, I will focus on the most 
basic “moral” behaviours. In doing so, I adopt the view that biology and morality 
are intertwined (cf. Alexander, 1987). Theorists such as Alexander (1987) and 
Binmore (2005) promote an empirical and naturalistic view of moral ity: instead 
of prescribing rules based on abstract principles, we can study what humans ac-
tually do. We can view morality as being based on social contracts, and success 
measured by the establishment of equilibria (see below about the Nash equilib-
rium). However, as Hamilton (1975) wrote, contractual morality has an in-built 
uncertainty: “It is very frequently necessary for one party to execute his half of 
a bargain without any way of being certain that the other party will later stick to 
his” (p. 150). Below, I review the concepts of direct reciprocity, indirect reciproc-
ity, and reputation as mechanisms that help ensure that the second half of the 
bargain is met. 
Direct Reciprocity 
There are many forms of dyadic (two-person) reciprocity (see Dugatkin, 
1997), but here I describe the most basic form (Binmore, 2005; Dugatkin, 1997; 
Sigmund, 2010): “When individual A copies what individual B does. Hence, if B 
gives, A gives back; if B fails to give, then A defects in return” (failure to recipro-
cate is called a “defection”). If a reciprocal relationship lasts for multiple rounds, 
then it can take the appearance of a feedback circuit or loop: A pays B, then B 
pays A back. Kolm (2000) averred that reciprocity is classifiable in two different 
ways: according to allocation (the actual budget of given and received items) and 
pro cess (the mechanism that enabled it — for example a psychological motiva-
tion). In this paper, we will reflect on both allocation and process. 
Stable cooperative relationships are formed as a summation of repeated 
in teractions, the exact pattern of which is unique to a particular dyad 
(Bowles and Gintis, 2011; Hinde, 1976). Mutually beneficial relationships are 
established after a progressive reduction of uncertainty between two actors 
about the benefits that arise after one actor signals an intention to benefit 
the other (Markl, 1985). A feedback circuit is perhaps not the best metaphor, 
because being a sender/receiv er is a role (rather than a characteristic) of an 
organism (Markl, 1985). For both parties to continue to respond to each 
other, there needs to be some two-way payoff; otherwise, “nothing in the 
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world can keep receivers dancing like puppets on the strings of the senders’ signals 
— unless it is to their own advantage, too, to be manipulated” (Markl, 1985, p. 
165). Responsiveness can be called “tightness” (Markl, 1985): how tight the loop is 
between signal and response (and wheth er a response occurs at all). When direct 
(pairwise) reciprocity occurs between sentient animals in natural settings, the 
“circuit” is created through behavioural episodes occurring at fairly unpredictable 
intervals between organisms who may or may not transact again. Each dyad, 
furthermore, does not stand in isolation, but is embedded within the complexity 
of an ecological niche with its connate social network (Alexander, 1987; Clutton–
Brock, 2009; Hinde, 1976; McGregor, 2005; Nowak and Highfield, 2011; Ostrom, 
2003). Reciprocation does not nec essarily consist of costs and benefits for each side; 
benefits may flow with both parties gaining rather than losing, becoming what is 
termed pseudoreciprocity or by-product mutualism (Alexander, 1987; Clutton–
Brock, 2009; Dugatkin, 1997). It is useful to focus on the simpler constituents of 
prosociality as a step towards understanding the larger social/cooperative structure 
of animal and human soci eties (Alexander, 1977, 1987; Clutton–Brock, 2009; 
Dawes, 1980; Dugatkin, 1997; Hinde, 1976; McGregor, 2005; Nowak and Highfield, 
2011; Sigmund, 2010, etc.). Reciprocity is widely regarded as a key mechanism in 
human sociality (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Kolm, 2000). Episodes of reciprocation 
— so common across cul tures, between friends or strangers, ingrained in our social 
norms — are elemen tary units of our cooperative societies which provide public 
goods, and which contribute to the survival of members of our species (Alexander, 
1987; Dawes, 1980; Nowak and Highfield, 2011). 
Markl (1985, p. 170) identified four scenarios of payoffs for dyadic relation-
ships: (1) both actors benefit (cooperation), (2) the sender benefits but not the 
receiver (exploitative), (3) the receiver benefits but not the sender (also exploit-
ative), and (4) neither benefit (a wasted effort). Direct reciprocity falls into the first 
category, but only if reciprocation occurs (otherwise it is exploitation). We can 
analyse these relationships using game theory: where a player’s probability of pay-
off is contingent on the behaviour of others (see Binmore, 2005; Dugat kin, 1997; 
Sigmund, 2010). The colloquialism “I’ll scratch your back, you scratch mine” is 
often invoked as a one-liner summary of reciprocity. To prevent oneself from 
suffering defection, it is helpful to avoid one-shot encounters and benefit from 
repeated encounters with reliable individuals. Binmore (2005, p. 10) elaborated: 
Rational reciprocity can’t work unless people interact repeatedly, without a definite 
end to their relationship in sight. If the reason I scratch your back today is that I 
expect you will then scratch my back tomorrow, then our cooperative arrangement 
will unravel if we know that there will eventually be no tomorrow. 
However, the possible extent of calculation is limited. Imagine that a human be-
ing (the scratcher) has his emotional life and culture all stripped away and what 
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remains is a coldly calculating person who thinks only of the payoff. For exam ple, 
this robotic-type might say to himself: “if I scratch his back for ten minutes, then 
there is a 95% chance that he will scratch my back for ten minutes within a week.” 
No person actually thinks quantitatively in this manner (precision would be impos-
sible). However, we are influenced by this kind of rationalistic dynamic on a func-
tional level. We might make the analogy of a rat in a Skinner box, be ing influenced 
by the principles of operant conditioning (e.g., Guttman, 1953). The actual quanti-
tative explanation of the rat’s behaviour is only calculable by the scientist standing 
outside the box taking measurements. The rat itself cannot un derstand the oper-
ant principles governing its own behaviour. We humans might regard ourselves 
intellectually superior to a rat — but psychologists (e.g., Simon, 1955, 1983) have 
known for a long time that cognitively we just do not follow the eco nomic rules of 
“rational man”; instead, we put in just enough mental effort to at tain some desired 
outcome (Gigerenzer, 1997) because we are not privy to the full information that 
would enable us to maximise our benefits at every step of our daily behaviour (Si-
mon, 1983). Furthermore, we are highly imperfect reasoning machines, sub ject to 
numerous biases (Ayton, 2010). We humans are typically like the rat in the Skinner 
box, and this includes situations where we respond to costs and benefits of recip-
rocal interactions (Binmore, 2005; Ostrom, 2003), much like how the un reflective 
rat in the Skinner box responds to the benefits of pushing a lever. That non-human 
animals show reciprocation behaviours is well established, although the proximate 
mechanisms (processes) are debated (see Clutton–Brock, 2009). 
Game theory is a system for investigating how payoffs differ according to the 
strategy adopted. Payoffs can be anything. For chimpanzees, payoff might literally 
be the receipt of “back-scratching” (i.e., social grooming, see Russell and Phelps, 
2013). For humans who play economic games, the payoff might be money (Dawes, 
1980). In direct reciprocity among moneyless organisms, the payoff might be your 
future reproductive success (Trivers, 1971). PAYOFF is a generic concept. Accord-
ingly, game theorists refer to utility (and its unit of measurement, util), a generic 
unit of payoff that results from a given decision (Binmore, 2005; Simon, 1955): as 
a currency, an util can be anything (whether it’s reproductive success, food, actual 
money, etc.) and even when undefined it can be used as a variable in biological or 
cognitive modelling (see Bowles and Gintis, 2011). In evolutionary game theory, 
costs and benefits can be numbered as “fitness units” addable or subtractable from 
a baseline fitness (Sober and Wilson, 1998). In our everyday thinking, we lack the 
perfect information that allows robotic-like total rationality — so instead we rely 
on our limited information and use cognitive shortcuts (Ayton, 2010; Gigeren zer, 
1997; Ostrom, 2003; Simon, 1983; Sober and Wilson, 1998; Sutherland, 1992). For 
example, the take-the-best strategy (Gigerenzer, 1997) is a proposal that binary 
decisions (choosing one or the other) are made using as few cues as possible (cf. 
Simon, 1955). It is plausible that a “take-the-best” strategy is applicable to binary 
decisions in the social realm too (e.g., decide to interact with someone or not).
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Sigmund (2010) delineated the mechanics of direct reciprocity in game 
theory terms (below described verbally, not mathematically). First, consider 
the Nash equilibrium (see also Binmore, 2005 and Ostrom, 2003) by imagining 
that player 1 can play two possible strategies — e1 and e2 — against player 2. 
This is a probability: if I play strategy e1 this time, what is the probability that 
I will play the same strategy (e1) next time? It all depends on player 2, who (for 
example) has two possible strategies of her own: f1 and f2. The Nash equilibrium 
is all about your “best response” to the other person’s strategy. Suppose player 
1 chooses e1 and player 2 chooses f1 — should player 1 stick to e1 or switch to 
e2? If the payoff is higher by playing e1 (instead of e2) in response to f1, then player 
1 will likely keep on playing e1 (his best response to f1). Remember, though, that the 
other’s dyadic game also consists of two strategies. Player 2 might have her own Nash 
equilibri um — for example that f1 is the best response to e1. Accordingly, the players 
can form an equilibrium pair and keep going in that same pattern which would prove 
beneficial for both. Suppose, however, the player 2 changes her strategy to f2. This 
might change the payoffs for player 1 and perhaps his new best response is now 
e2 (or perhaps it stays the same). Thus, the game changes according to the be-
haviour on both sides of the dyad. Establishing equilibrium pairs through repeti-
tion is key to establishing a cooperative relationship within a dyad. Based on this, 
there have been many models of dyadic cooperation in the literature (see Bin-
more, 2005; Bowles and Gintis, 2011; Dugatkin, 1997, Sigmund, 2010). Games, of 
course, can have multiple equilibria, not just two (Binmore, 2005). Furthermore, 
there is huge variability of human behaviours, meaning that Nash equilibria are 
often reached at the group rather than individual level (Ostrom, 2003). As Alex-
ander (1987) wrote, successful sociality is about “flexible strategizing” (p. 9). Such 
games, as described above (and laboratory experiments designed to test them), 
cannot begin to capture all of the messy complexity of real life (Binmore, 2005; 
Ostrom, 2003): nonetheless, such games are useful tools for understanding the 
principles that explain behaviour. 
Imagine a different scenario where an organism is not only two, but many —
living in a finite population where individuals might have three possible dyadic 
strategies (Sigmund, 2010): (1) always cooperate, (2) always defect (i.e., never 
give anything), (3) be choosy and do tit-for-tat (cooperate when meeting a co-
op erator, defect when meeting a defector). There have been many agent-based 
computer simulations where individual agents are programmed to use only one 
strategy each (e.g., Nowak and Sigmund, 1998). A typical such simulation com-
prises a series of iterations (one generation after another) and, after the program 
starts running, we assess the simulation by looking at how the proportions of 
types (cooperate/defect/choosy) alter over time. There are many questions to ask 
here. What type of agent will succeed in such a simulation? Will the population 
be overtaken by defectors? Will the co-operators prevail? Or, is choosiness the 
only path that allows cooperation to flourish? You can look at a population and 
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see how the percentages of each changes over time (e.g., see Bowles and Gintis, 
2011; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998; Sigmund, 2010). For example, if the simula tion 
begins with 100% co-operators, then it is fairly easy for defectors (who might 
appear suddenly due to mutation) to take over; but the defectors cannot dominate 
the population if discriminators are present. It all depends on proportions 
(Sigmund, 2010; Sober and Wilson, 1998): the initial mix of types, and how the 
interactions cause some groups to benefit over others (e.g., co-operators diminish 
in the population because they are giving too much away and not getting anything 
in return). The idea is that those who have successful strategies replicate (produce 
offspring using the same strategy) while those using unsuccessful strategies head 
towards extinction (if you don’t get enough favours, you don’t live to replicate). 
Therefore, strategies are said to “evolve” (increasing, decreasing, or staying about 
the same across iterations). How does a scientist decide the outcome of this 
complex mix? The possible out comes can be derived from the replicator equation 
(described mathematically in Bowles and Gintis, 2011 and Sigmund, 2010). The 
replicator equation helps to predict how quickly a particular strategy will grow 
within this finite population, and the answer is that “a strategy ei will spread or 
dwindle depending on whether it does better or worse than average” (Sigmund, 
2010, p. 31). The equation takes the average payoff to a particular strategy (e.g., 
a co-operator) and subtracts from that the average payoff of all individuals using 
all strategies (e.g., co-operators, defectors, and discriminators). Who tends to win, 
then? Generally, it depends on the numbers (how much percentage of each exists 
in the first place), but the discriminating strategies often win out. Defectors lose 
out when discriminators notice they are defecting; co-operators lose out because 
they are not choosy — but they can flourish when there are few or no defectors 
around (Bowles and Gin tis, 2011; Dugatkin, 1997; Sigmund, 2010). Sometimes one 
can even get rock­pa per­scissor dynamics (Sigmund, 2010): the proportions of each 
strategy oscillate, whereupon every strategy takes turns in being the most common. 
A primary lesson here is that it pays to be choosy (Sober and Wilson, 1998). 
Referring to the environment of ancestral humans, Bowles and Gintis (2011) 
wrote that “those who failed to distinguish between long-term or short-term or 
one-shot interactions would be at a significant fitness disadvantage” (p. 96). In 
other words, treating everybody as a trusted friend will not necessarily benefit 
you. Given this risk, there must be some underlying principle that explains why 
people habitually act pro-socially, even to strangers. 
Reputation and Indirect Reciprocity
Add a third person to a dyadic interaction and a triad emerges (Faust, 2007). 
When a three-way interaction occurs, it is nearly impossible for each actor to en-
gage in precisely 33% of the interaction. There is inevitably some imbalance, with 
two of the actors more deeply involved than the third (cf. chimpanzee grooming 
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patterns described by Russell, 2007). Sometimes the third actor is not directly 
involved at all, but is merely watching the interaction. The proportion of non-
in volved individuals will increase further as the group size increases. This 
situa tion (being a triad or higher) sets the scene for indirect reciprocity. As 
Alexander (1987, pp. 94–95) described it:
I regard indirect reciprocity as a consequence of direct reciprocity occurring in the 
presence of interested audiences — groups of individuals who continually evaluate 
the members of their society as possible future interactants from whom they would 
like to gain more than they lose (this outcome, of course, can be mutual).
In real life, cooperation is multidirectional. This is true throughout nature: all 
the way from the level of RNA hypercycles to that of human teamwork (see 
Bourke, 2011). Many models of cooperation have focused on the dyad (e.g., 
Bowles and Gintis, 2011; Dugatkin, 1997; Ostrom, 2003; Trivers, 1971). These 
dyadic models are predicated on the phenomenon of trust (see Kohn, 2009) 
— as well as using your knowledge of past behaviour to guide your current 
behaviour (for reviews and discussions, see Alexander, 1987; Dugatkin, 1997; 
McElreath, Clutton–Brock, Fehr, Fessler, Hagen, Hammerstein et al., 2003). 
Evidence from human studies shows that face-to-face contact is very important 
in establishing trust (Ostrom, 2003); but face-to-face contact cannot always 
happen. As a population grows larger, the probability of repeated interactions 
is reduced (because a per son encounters strangers more and familiars less). 
In this case, being choosy is an essential strategy, because an indiscriminately 
generous person in a mixed population will always end up with a lower payoff 
than defectors (see Sober and Wilson, 1998, pp. 19–23). If learning whether 
to trust someone depended solely on direct encounters, then helpers are 
vulnerable to defection when helping a stranger the first time (Pollock and 
Dugatkin, 1992). This is a problem that can be by-passed if the helper has 
prior knowledge of how the potential recipient behaved in the past towards 
others. Reputation is useful here. It is that knowledge source. 
Alexander (1977, 1987) proposed that indirect reciprocity (“A observes B help 
C, therefore A helps B”) — a system that rewards the generous and punishes the 
selfish — is a defining mechanism of human moral systems (also see Binmore, 
2005; Bowles and Gintis, 2011; Dugatkin, 1997; McElreath et al., 2003; Nowak 
and Highfield, 2011; Sigmund, 2010). Indirect reciprocity can occur in other 
forms too, such as “A helps B, B helps C, C helps A” (Alexander, 1987, p. 81), a 
form which will not be covered here. Another name for indirect reciprocity is 
“vicarious reciprocity” (Sigmund, 2010). The population-level benefit of indirect 
reciprocity might be simply summarised by saying that “everyone may gain when 
social beneficence is prevalent” (Alexander, 1987, p. 210; cf. Kohn, 2009). Howev er, 
indirect reciprocity is not a synonym for “generalized reciprocity” (Alexander, 1987, 
p. 85). According to indirect reciprocity, when people are good, the strategy is 
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ultimately self-serving despite the up-front costs (Alexander, 1987). The bene fits of 
indirect reciprocity towards a well-regarded individual can manifest in at least three 
ways: (1) direct compensation from all or part of a group (e.g., when someone is 
deemed a hero), (2) more opportunities to engage in fruitful interaction due to being 
approached by third parties who witnessed the generosity, and (3) the generosity 
ulti mately benefits the group to which the generous person is a part — and perhaps 
even benefiting that person’s own descendants (Alexander, 1987, p. 94). 
Importantly, the terms indirect reputation and indirect reciprocity should not 
be confused. The former refers to an information source and the latter refers to 
the moral/social system that is enabled by the information source (Alexander, 
1987; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998). Reputation is construable as one component 
of an interacting system where repeated social dilemmas (Dawes, 1980; Ostrom, 
2003) are worked through when reputation feeds into trust, which feeds into the 
probability of reciprocity, leading hopefully to the best collective outcome possi-
ble (see Ostrom, 2003, pp. 49–61). Indirect reciprocity requires that group mem-
bers monitor each other's reputations, ideally creating conditions where generous 
individuals prosper and selfish individuals suffer (Alexander, 1987; McElreath 
et al., 2003; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998; Pollock and Dugatkin, 1992). Over the 
years, a series of agent-based computer simulations have been developed to ex-
plore this possibility using an image scoring paradigm (Brandt and Sigmund, 
2005; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998; reviewed in McElreath et al., 2003). “Image 
score” is a numerical measure of how generous an individual person has been to 
others. The aim of these simulations was to explore the conditions under which 
image scoring individuals (those who preferentially give rewards to those with 
sufficiently high image scores) would dominate a population that also consists of 
defectors (never help anyone) and unconditional givers (help others indiscrimi-
nately). The main conclusion from these models is that helping is an evolutionarily 
stable strategy (the population resists being overwhelmed by defectors; see Park er 
and Smith, 1990) only if the majority of the population consists of strict image 
scorers (Brandt and Sigmund, 2005; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998). The models 
inspired a series of real-life human experiments which showed that people actu-
ally do spontaneously consider reputation when deciding whom to reward; and 
that they behave more cooperatively in order to preserve their good reputations 
(Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2009; Wedekind and Milinski, 2000, etc.). Import-
ant to note, however, is that indirect reciprocity is not the only mechanism for 
preventing defections. Many large-scale human endeavours come about through 
institutionalisation — entailing the creation of formal organisations where things 
are put in writing and mechanisms designed to put principles above individual 
proclivities are in place (Alexander, 1987; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Urpelainen, 
2011). For example, think about the massive amount of planning and cooperation 
needed to successfully operate a highly complex entity such as London Heathrow 
Airport (Wicks, 2014): multiple levels of organisation are needed to manage 
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more than 76,000 people — each with a unique set of skills and stipulations — 
in their respective roles all geared towards the simply-stated (yet highly tricky to 
coor dinate) goal of managing airplane arrivals and departures (an average of 1400 
per day). Heathrow is a conspicuous example — but there are countless other 
types of organisations, large and small, that would be difficult or impossible to 
run without coordinated (and often highly regimented) action between strang-
ers. Institutions often save us the trouble at needing to gather social information 
helping us decide with whom to work. In a place like Heathrow Airport, one does 
not usually need to know the reputations of those with whom one cooperates in 
order to get a plane to fly: people know each other’s roles by default (baggage han-
dler, pilot, etc.) and can therefore successfully collaborate with complete strang-
ers constantly. Defecting is minimised through a set of rules and punishments 
(see Fehr and Gächter, 2000 for a review of reciprocity and punishment in the 
workplace; cf. Sober and Wilson, 1998). We might consider Heathrow Airport as 
a highly codified, almost reputation-free zone. This is one extreme on a spectrum 
of social situations. Another extreme is a setting consisting of familiars only: the 
kin, the friends, the neighbours, etc. This is where an abundance of information 
about the people one can interact with lies: not only that of an individual person, 
but the relationships between those individuals. Non-human animals, of course, 
usually exist (in the natural world) only amongst familiars (Hinde, 1976). It is we 
humans who cast the net wider. 
Let us think again about the replicator dynamics, this time for indirect reci-
procity (Bowles and Gintis, 2011; Sigmund, 2010), referring (as before) to the 
simulated population consisting of co-operator, defector, and discriminator. 
Now, the discriminator (the choosy one) needs to rely on the image score, which 
in a computer simulation can be as simple as 0/1 (known to be either generous 
in the previous round or not). The replicator dynamics equation here needs to 
incorporate the payoff for the reciprocator, who gives out a benefit only if the 
recipient has a good reputation, or when no information is available (in other 
words, reciprocators cooperate except when encountering a bad reputation). 
How can a discriminating strategy evolve in this setting in order to produce a 
simulation where cooperation is dominant? This depends, first of all, on whether 
reputations are knowable. As Sigmund (2010) says, “if the probability… to know 
the co-players’ past is too small (i.e., if there is not much scope for reputation), 
then cooperation cannot evolve... .  [A] cooperative population consisting of these 
two types of altruists (some conditional and some not) exists, if the average level 
of information within the population is sufficiently high” (p. 86). Once reputa-
tion becomes possible, then it all depends on the numbers: what percentage of 
the population is occupied by either co-operators, defectors, or discriminators. 
Obviously, too high a percentage of defectors will not allow cooperation to flour-
ish — and too high a percentage of “gullible” co-operators will simply allow the 
defectors to take over unbridled. What is needed is a high-enough proportion of 
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discriminators to be the bulwark against the takeover by the selfish. A coopera-
tive population can exist, even if there are many defectors and many gullibles, as 
long as the largest group happens to consist of discriminators (see Sigmund, 2010 
for the mathematical treatment and implications of varying parameters). Now, let 
us think again about the knowability of reputation. Thinking across all animals, 
this depends very much on cognitive ability. Examples like Heathrow irresistibly 
remind us of insect societies, such as leafcutter ants (Nowak and Highfield, 2011) 
where success is implemented by seven different castes (anatomically differentiat ed) 
to carry out specialised tasks (within a world of chemical signalling). Clearly, 
complex cooperation arises non- or minimally cognitively across all facets of life 
(Bourke, 2011). This is why it is important to clarify the issue of when and why 
indirect reciprocity needs deliberation and when it does not.
The Cognitive Substrate of Indirect Reciprocity
 
In encountering animal studies, the temptation is often to infer human-style 
cognition. It is obvious that animals collect information (McGregor, 2005). As an 
information source, indirect reputation will flow ubiquitous ly from any animal 
communication network where it is possible to eavesdrop without being directly 
involved (Markl, 1985; McGregor, 2005).1 The question, if we are thinking across 
the animal kingdom, is: What depth of processing occurs in animals living within 
these communication networks (Russell, 2007)? Evolu tionary and psychological 
explanations of cooperative behaviour are interrelated (Sober and Wilson, 1998, 
pp. 203–205). It is useful to think of biological explana tion the way Tinbergen 
(1963) delineated, in which every biological explanation can be construed in four 
ways: (1) phylogenetic (how it evolved), (2) ontogenetic (how it develops), (3) 
functional (why it evolved), and (4) proximate (the actu al mechanism that en-
ables it). In the animal kingdom, all examples of indirect reciprocity will have 
a functional explanation (number 3 above). Kolm’s (2000) prescription for rec-
iprocity can be applied to indirect reciprocity: thinking sep arately about alloca-
tion (the actual budget of given and received items) and pro cess (the mechanism 
that enabled it). The questions of interest to psychologists tend to be those of 
process, that is, the proximate mechanisms (usually favouring cognitive expla-
nations, with a special bias towards assuming conscious aware ness). It is often 
difficult to write about non-sentient evolutionary processes in a way that does not 
sound like one is writing about characters in a play. This is why it is important to 
reiterate Tinbergen’s “four whys.” The issue of what is happening in the animal’s 
mind when it engages in indirect reciprocity is a proximate-level description. At 
its simplest, indirect reciprocity is describable in terms of a dyadic interaction 
1Here, I use the word “eavesdrop” to refer to any modality, whether it is from sight, sound, chemical 
senses, or other means. 
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(e.g., “A → B”) that would not have occurred unless the actor had been primed 
by having observed an earlier interaction involving the recipient (e.g., “A had 
observed B → C”). Of course, this structure can also describe punishment (e.g., 
“A attacked B, because earlier B attacked C”). Three conditions are necessary for 
(positive) indirect reciprocity to occur: (1) favours occur in a setting observable 
by third parties, (2) the third party is motivated to reward the rewarder, and (3) 
the third party is influenced by indirect reputation. 
The first condition, observability of behaviour, is the prerequisite for all phe nomena 
involving reputationally based cooperative behaviour. Among humans, behaviour 
might be observed second- or third-hand through verbal gossip, whereas pre-linguistic 
animals are limited to direct observation. A wide variety of species have evolved 
observational skills that effortlessly detect cues and signals emitted from others 
regardless of where the emitter was aiming (it is possible, of course, that a signal is 
emitted without an intended direction). In this con text, a field of public informa­
tion evolves in the mind’s eye of the species — the populations of which are now 
able to interpret “inadvertent social information” (Danchin, Giraldeau, Valone, 
and Wagner, 2004). The second condition concerns the proximate motivation of 
the third party in repaying the favour on behalf of the recipient. There are four 
ways to partition this, as explained below.
1. There is no motivation (on a cognitive level). Above, indirect reciprocity was 
described in its simplest form: an interaction occurring as a consequence of the 
actor being primed by a prior interaction involving the recipient and a third par-
ty. Defined this way, indirect reciprocity can be identified anywhere the above 
causality is established, regardless of the level of cognition of the actors. Some ex-
amples are found among cleaner fish and their “clients” (Bshary, 2002) [“clients” 
refers to the recipient of prosocial behavior, e.g., other species of fish]. Here, cli-
ents observe the interactions of cleaner fish towards the third parties; those clean-
ers who defect (eat living flesh in addition to the dead flesh that they are supposed 
to be cleaning off) are avoided by the clients more than cleaners who do not cheat 
(Bshary, 2002). Indirect reciprocity is likely restricted here to a functional rather 
than an explanation. How much the fish actually understands the third-party 
interactions is open to debate, but the point shown by Bshary is that such events 
can be identified in cases where sophisticated cognitive abilities are unproven (it 
is possible, of course, that fish are cleverer than we think — but we are safest for 
now in assuming that indirect reciprocity is happening with minimal cognition 
in this class of animal). 
2. There is a selfish motivation. Alexander (1987) suggested that individuals 
may reward the rewarder simply as a by-product of their desire to interact with 
someone known to be cooperative. If cleaner fish clients (Bshary, 2002) were 
hu man-style conscious beings, then their motivations might be regarded as self-
ish: they reward non-cheating cleaner fish by offering themselves, in the process 
re warding both themselves (being cleaned) and the cleaner (who obtains food). 
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Traditional economic theories predict humans to behave this way, but empirical 
results show that humans in economic games behave selfishly only part of the 
time (Binmore, 2005; Schram, 2000). This implies that humans have something 
to gain by behaving pro-socially (see next point). Interestingly, chimpanzees are 
more likely than humans to behave in a self-interested manner consistent with 
traditional economic theories (Jensen, Call, and Tomasello, 2007). 
3. There is a motivation to behave pro­socially “for its own sake.” Schram (2000) 
identified three reasons that humans might pursue a conscious pro-sociality. The 
first is the “warm glow of giving” where an individual cooperates because it feels 
good to do so (see also Binmore, 2005; Pradel and Fetchenhauer, 2010; Sober 
and Wilson, 1998, pp. 267–271). As mentioned above, such feelings could arise 
by association with past positive outcomes. This means that being generous (e.g., 
giving to a charity to help starving children) can actually be selfish: “If you were 
an egoist, you would help the starving, but your ultimate motive would be to 
make yourself feel good” (Sober and Wilson, 1998, p. 244). The second reason is 
fairness, where an individual cooperates on the contingency that the partner co-
operates. This is the basis of a number of tit-for-tat cooperation models (Dugat-
kin, 1997; Trivers, 1971), which in humans involves knowing reciprocity norms 
(Binmore, 2005). Operating in this manner requires that an individual engage in 
mental score-keeping: keeping track of all past activities of one’s trading partners 
(see also Call, 2002; Schino and Aureli, 2009). Theoretical models have intro-
duced many variations on this general idea (e.g., contrite tit-for-tat; see Dugatkin, 
1997). Among apes, mental score-keeping is unproven but possible (Call, 2002; 
Schino and Aureli, 2009). Whether apes can really recognise reciprocity norms is 
unclear (cf. Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, and Moll, 2005). The third reason 
identified by Schram (2000) was other-regarding: concern for the well-being of 
someone else (perhaps emotionally charged). All of the above reasons could ap-
ply to indirect reciprocity. 
4. There is a motivation based on consciously known cooperative gains. This 
occurs when an individual understands collaborative behaviour (Schram, 2000): 
that a goal cannot be accomplished unless individuals work together (cf. Dawes, 
1980; Dugatkin, 1997; Ostrom, 2003). This is not a difficult task if two individ-
uals are standing side-by-side co-operating to achieve an immediate goal. Even 
chimpanzees can do this if trained, but only if the reward is forthcoming to both. 
If one chimpanzee does not receive an immediate observable reward, then that 
individual will probably not cooperate (Jensen, Hare, Call, and Tomasello, 2006). 
In the case of indirect reciprocity, this would require an explicit understanding 
concerning how indirect reciprocity maintains the overall pro-sociality of the 
group. In real-life terms, this might be seen among human societies where com-
munity spirit plays a salient role in people’s lives, for example, in the Indone sian 
farming community that Schweizer (1989) studied, where the concept of neigh-
bourly harmony was an influential factor in social and religious life. This prevented 
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families from adopting practices that maximised financial income at the expense 
of community members (cf. Dawes, 1980). Two examples were cited: (a) farming 
families chose labourer hiring practices that distributed wealth more evenly, and 
(b) families never eschewed their obligation to host a slametan, a re ligiously-based 
feast that was thought to spiritually benefit the whole community (despite the 
expense to the family). These examples represent a form of indirect reciprocity, 
because generous behaviour is rewarded (but not in a dyadic tit-for-tat manner). 
Although some of this pro-social behaviour is probably motivated by a fear of 
ostracism (Schweizer, 1989), everyone is aware of the relationship between one’s 
own behaviour and the community's well being (cf. Urpelainen, 2011).
 As illustrated, there are many paths to indirect reciprocity. It is a behavioural 
example of the evolutionary principle of functional equivalence, meaning that 
it is possible to identify a number of different proximate mechanisms which 
“all deliver roughly the same behaviors in the same circumstances” (Sober and 
Wilson, 1998, p. 206). Indirect reciprocity is a beneficial strategy in particular 
circumstances, and different animals have evolved different levels of necessary 
cognition. Among humans, each of the above levels of motivation should occur. 
Moreover, selfish and pro-social motivations can co-exist and intermingle (for 
example, “person A might have initially helped B for selfish reasons, had been 
rewarded, and then started to care for B’s welfare without wanting a reward,” cf. 
Sober and Wilson, 1998, pp. 217–222, 242–250, 319–321). Although we congratu-
late ourselves on being able to adopt the most cognitively sophisticated strategies 
in the animal kingdom, much of the time we are likely getting by with a mini-
mum of cogitation (Newell and Shanks, 2014): indirect reciprocity may occur 
unplanned, be a by-product of a selfish motivation, or follow genuinely pro-social 
sentiments motivated either by a feel-good factor or from a self-aware intention 
to contribute to the common good (see Ostrom, 2003). Among non-humans, 
there is still much to learn about how this works. To address this question, the 
best approach is probably to emulate approaches equivalent to Byrne and Whiten 
(1997) when they searched for deception in the animal kingdom (see also Byrne, 
2003): find as many instances as possible where deception occurs and only later 
start worrying about characterising the cognition (if any) that is involved. We can 
do the same for indirect reciprocity.
Thus, when indirect reciprocity occurs, premeditation may not be necessary. It 
should be useful to identify instances of indirect reciprocity in nature as a possi-
ble context where individuals are heeding each other’s reputations. The evidence 
for indirect reciprocity among non-human primates is sketchy, but there are pos-
sible candidates in the literature. One example is the possible revenge system de-
scribed by Aureli, Cozzolino, Cordisch, and Scucchi (1992) in macaques, where 
individuals would attack the family member of an aggressor. Another example is 
in a catalogue of “triplet interactions” by Mori (1983) on free-ranging chimpan zees: 
sequences of behaviours where a dyadic interaction was soon followed by a different 
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dyadic interaction involving one of the previous interactants (see Mori, 1983, Table 
8). Twenty different types of triadic interaction were identified, two of which may 
qualify for indirect reciprocity. One interaction type was where “a first appeasing 
chimpanzee became the recipient in the second interaction” (Mori, 1983, p. 58, 
#4 in Table 8). The other one was a revenge incident (#9 in Table 8) similar to 
that reported by Aureli et al. (1992). Reputation probably plays a role in such 
interactions. For a researcher interested in reputational thinking, the key issue 
is whether an individual can compare relationships between self and other to 
relationships among third parties (Russell, 2007). At best, we can take a “bird’s 
eye view” and imagine living within a complex social structure and be aware of 
our place in it. Most of the time, we are not doing this explicity. 
Social Expertise
It would be valuable to apply cognitive–psychological models of expertise to 
the social and non-human sphere. I will start with what Markl (1985, p. 165) 
said about the recipient of animal signals:
 
Of course, addressees are not sitting around in extra-evolutionary space offering 
[unmodifiable] releasing mechanisms just waiting to be manipulated; in fact, it is 
well known that there is hardly anything that can be more easily modified both 
by evolution and individual experience — where we call it focusing of attention 
— than reaction thresholds and response selectivity of releasing mechanisms or 
senso ry-neural pattern recognition devices. 
Not learning means not surviving. “Inflexibility or preprogramming would be 
the worst possible strategy in the face of conflicts of interest, competition, the 
im portance of cooperation, and other aspects of sociality” (Alexander, 1987, p. 
9). The history of interactions that leads to something we can call a “relationship” 
(Hinde, 1976) is also the story of successive learning experiences, gauging and 
re-gauging expectations (Markl, 1985). This might lead to something we can 
call expertise. 
Social expertise is something that Humphrey (1976) compares to chess: a 
game played with a reactive partner, where competence depends on accumulated 
knowledge, ability to keep track of changeable circumstances depending on the 
opponent’s behaviour, and planning ahead according to what others may do. The 
Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis (Byrne and Whiten, 1997) construed so-
cial expertise as a skilled manipulation of others for personal gain. This requires 
“mind reading” ability (Byrne and Whiten, 1997), which is generally the skill of 
visualising the point of view of another’s perception and intentions, seeing how 
intervening variables alter such intentions, and being able to identify deceptive 
behaviours (cf. Tomasello et al., 2005). This view of expertise can be nested within 
a broader framework called the social brain hypothesis (Dunbar, 2003; Dunbar, 
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Gamble, and Gowlett, 2014), where function is emphasized: the burden of main-
taining an optimal size of one's personal social network within larger social 
groups. According to this view, ecological factors put pressure on individuals to 
form large groups in order to enhance survival (Bourke, 2011; Dunbar, 1988), 
which in turn creates selective pressure for the evolution of increased size in the 
areas of the brain that facilitate social expertise (Dunbar, 2003). There appears to 
be a widely held opinion that the key skill of manipulation is an ability to anticipate 
another’s behaviour based on a talent for mind reading (a.k.a. theory of mind or 
experience projection) [e.g., Byrne and Whiten, 1997; Dunbar, 2003; Humphrey, 
1976]. The term “mind reading,” of course, has been used to describe intention 
reading even in less cognitively advanced animals, referring to an animal’s innate 
reactions to certain cues and signals (cf. Krebs and Dawkins, 1984). What makes 
mind reading “expert” is the knowledge base that the animal draws upon in order 
to behave proficiently. As Donald (2001) writes, such mental feats “demand con-
siderable memory, since each individual must have a ‘slot’ in the tracker’s mind, 
which must be kept up to date” (p. 129). Monkeys and apes accumulate consider-
able knowledge about their conspecifics in at least three domains (Call, 2002): (1) 
information about how individuals behave, (2) the quality of their relationships 
with others, and (3) the quality of relationships among third parties. This type of 
knowledge base permits an individual to engage in social manipulation: where 
a manipulator induces a conspecific to behave in a certain way in order to ac-
complish a goal desired by the manipulator. For example, begging to receive food 
is a form of dyadic manipulation (“A induced B to do X”) [Call, 2002]. A more 
complex skill is triadic manipulation (Call, 2002), where a manipulator induces a 
conspecific to behave a certain way towards a third party (“A induced B to induce 
C to do X”). Both dyadic and triadic manipulations are known as “social tool use,” 
an expert skill that requires accumulated knowledge about the typical behaviour 
of others, along with some ability “to generate hypotheses about who interacts 
with whom, when and how” (Call, 2002, p. 178). 
Even dyadic manipulation requires some form of indirect reputation — be cause 
the only way for A to learn the causal chain between a conspecific and a desired 
outcome is to observe how B behaves towards something in the environ ment, and to 
see how that behaviour leads to the outcome. What differentiates this from technical 
tool use (observing how a tool behaves towards the environ ment) is the fact that the 
social tool involves an animate being (Call, 2002), and hence there is a built-in source 
of uncertainty (whether B will behave the way anticipated). Triadic manipulation 
entails the same observational learning as dy adic manipulation, except that the 
causal chain now has two sources of uncer tainty (whether either B and C will 
behave the way anticipated). How might an individual overcome such uncertainty 
in order to make the social manipulation work? Pure luck is obviously a factor 
(but one that likely underpays). What might facilitate higher payoffs is predictive 
ability, where individual A has learned — by experience — what behaviours to 
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expect from individuals B and C during the relevant events. To illustrate this 
advantage, consider the following hypothetical situation about food sharing. 
Imagine that individual A observes that C is monopolizing a local food source 
(i.e., can prevent others from getting it). A desires the food, but knows from past 
experience that C will not offer any food if approached. However, A knows two 
other things:
 
(1) if B approaches C, then C always gives food to B 
(2) if A (self) approaches B, then B always gives food to A 
Here, triadic manipulation can occur if A induces B to approach C for food. 
When B obtains the food and carries it away, this provides an opportunity for A 
to beg for food from B. Additionally, suppose that individuals D and E are also 
nearby, but that A knows three other facts:
 
(3) if D begs for food from C, then C will refuse 
(4) if A begs for food from E, then E will refuse 
(5) if E begs for food from C, then C will give food to E 
Obviously, it is pointless for A to engage D or E in social manipulation because 
D cannot obtain food from C, and E won’t give it to A (even if getting it from C). 
If A knows this, then A will approach B and nobody else. This might comprise a 
form of declarative memory (Anderson, 1983): learned factual knowledge stored 
as long-term memory traces (interconnections). Facts in the long-term memory 
can be organised into themes, whereupon a number of thematically related facts 
are interconnected. This is one basis for an expert memory. It might be useful 
here to refer to general theories of expertise — in order to illuminate mechanisms 
that might also apply in the social domain. On the topic of non-social human 
expertise, there is a long and rich history of psychological testing and theorising 
(de Groot and Gobet, 1996; Ericsson, Charness, Feltovich, and Hoffman, 2006; 
Gobet, Chassy, and Bilalić, 2011; Russell, 2011; Sternberg, 1997). Some primate 
researchers have made detailed comparisons between physical and social reason-
ing, in an attempt to delineate commonalities and contrasts in the required intel-
lectual abilities between species (e.g., Call, 2002). The cognitive mechanisms of 
human expertise have been characterised in many different ways over the years, 
but there is general agreement that expert skill acquisition involves deliberate 
practice, learning a large number of relevant patterns, cultivating a long-term 
memory base where memory traces are flexibly accessed, and understanding 
how to respond appropriately to meaningful patterns (Anderson, 1983; Gobet et 
al., 2011; Russell, 2011; Sternberg, 1997). In the food-sharing example presented 
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above, individual A knew the reputations of individuals B, C, D, and E based on 
past experience. As mentioned earlier, typicality is key (cf. Emler, 1990). Another 
key issue in expertise is the amount of accumulated knowledge (Sternberg, 1997), 
and this is applicable in the social realm too.
Table 1
Third Party Knowledge of Possible Direct Benefits Based on Indirect 
Observation of Focal Animal’s Current Behaviour to Someone Else 
Knowledge Base (friend) 
A watches what B (friend) is doing to F: 
If B → √ → F, then B → √ → A 100% of time 
If B → X → F, then B → √ → A 100% of time
Knowledge Base (semi-friend)
A watches what C (semi-friend) is doing to F: 
If C → √ → F, then C → √ → A 100% of time 
If C → X → F, then C → √ → A 70% of time 
and C → X → A 30% of time
Knowledge Base (non-friend)
A watches what D (non-friend) is doing to F:
If D → √ → F, then D → √ → A 100% of time 
If D → X → F, then D → √ → A 20% of time 
and D → X → A 80% of time
Knowledge Base (enemy)
A watches what E (enemy) is doing to F: 
If E → √ → F, then E → √ → A 100% of time 
If E → X → F, then E → X → A 100% of time
Note: This is a kind of rudimentary classification system; here, the individual has a 
non-verbal “knowledge base” about each category of friend, semi-friend, non-friend, 
and enemy, which facil itates an appraisal of what is likely to happen. It implies knowledge 
about each of the individuals involved. Thus, you are less likely to approach an enemy for 
food because he will likely refuse you even if he has been seen feeding someone else. At 
one extreme, there is the friend (100% chance of feeding you if he fed someone else). At 
the other extreme, there is the enemy (0% chance). There are also two other situations 
(semi-friend, non-friend) which we can regard as representing two points along a con-
tinuum between the extremes. The X refers to hostile behaviour (e.g., attack). The check 
mark (√) refers to friendly behaviour (e.g., feed). Arrows indicate the direction of these 
behaviours. For example, B → √ → F means that individual B is friendly to individual F; 
and B → X → F means that B is hostile to F.
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Employing an “if–then” syntax in social reasoning (de Waal, 2003), Table 
1 (above) is a conjectural framework showing how a person (possibly also an 
animal) might employ this syntax when facing others who represent four different 
grades of social relationship: (1) a friend, (2) a semi-friend, (3) a non-friend, and 
(4) an enemy (all numbers are notional). These grades do not presume formal 
labels in the mind (cf. Spears, 2011). What these labels represent will, however, 
some how have real-life denotation. Specifically, Table 1 shows a scenario where 
an animal begins to recognise differences in direct experience that correlate with 
observed third-party interactions. Observ er A will know how every individual 
(friend, semi-friend, non-friend, enemy) is likely to behave towards A, after 
observing how these individuals behaved towards others. In all cases, in the 
table, friendliness begets friendliness. Diff erences arise in what happens after the 
conspecifics are observed being hostile towards others. The friend is the easiest 
to comprehend and trust, because the behaviour is friendly to A 100% of the 
time. The second easiest to compre hend is the enemy, who, if hostile to others, 
is hostile to A. The behaviour of the non-friend is less predictable: if hostile to 
others, the non-friend is usually — but not always — hostile to A. In the case of 
the semi-friend, there is also unpredictability: if hostile to others, the semi-friend 
is usually — but not al ways — friendly to A. The rate of hostility is low (only 
30%), which means that the observer should regard friendliness as the default 
expectation. The if–then syntax is the basis upon which an observer develops 
an understanding about the correlations between direct reputational experience 
(e.g., how B behaved towards me) and indirect reputation (e.g., how B behaved 
towards others). The knowledge of this correlation is an impression inside the 
animal’s mind, estab lished during a personal history between the observer and 
the other animal (information by direct reputation), and intuitively cross-checked 
against the other’s interaction with others (information by indirect reputation). 
Thinking of conspecific behaviour in a probabilistic manner (as above) is 
useful because some kinds of information are important for survival, such as 
avoiding attack: hostile behaviour necessitates that the observer be vigilant. As 
Dunbar (1988) wrote, the “amount of visual monitoring that an animal does is 
primarily a function of its nervousness, and reflects the animal’s need to keep 
track of the movements of the more dominant individuals in order to avoid 
being attacked unawares” (p. 115). Situations like this are where it is advanta-
geous to have an additional channel of information (e.g., indirect reputation) 
in addition to personal encounter (direct reputation). As Sober and Wilson 
(1998) wrote: “two sources of evidence are better than one, as far as reliability is 
concerned” (p. 307). When facing the conspecifics, as presented in Table 1, the 
ob server would be vigilant when facing the enemy and non-friend (because they 
might attack); and non-vigilant when facing the friend and semi-friend (be-
cause they are unlikely to attack). For everyone but the enemy, expectations are 
based on some degree of trust (cf. Kohn, 2009). It is beneficial for an observer 
RECIPROCITY AND REPUTATION 267
to be non-vigilant most of the time, because this frees the observer’s attention 
to focus on other things (e.g., feeding) [Dunbar, 1988]. Accuracy of assessment 
would be valuable here, enabling the observer to know when to relax, and with 
whom to associate. However, small sample sizes could create misleading im-
pressions. To know that the semi-friend is friendly 70% of the time (as per 
Table 1), the observer should perhaps witness at least ten occurrences during 
which friendliness occurred seven times. If the observer has witnessed only 
one occurrence and it was hostile, a misleading impression has been formed 
— making the observer unnecessarily vigilant in the semi-friend’s presence (an 
example where a “larger sample size,” i.e., more encounters, would be useful). It 
seems clear that the direct and indirect experience would have unequal influ-
ence on that social impression. There is surely what Sober and Wilson (1998) 
call “D/I asymmetry”: the direct (D) experience will likely be more reliable than 
indirect (I) experience. In gaining indirect knowledge, you may not have seen 
all of the relevant events that make an accurate impression; furthermore, the 
occurences are towards other people (not you). We can also make a note about 
the third form, gossip: it is a cheap form of information (cf. Smith and Harper, 
2004) for a couple of reasons. Firstly, it is the most subject to distortion (you did 
not observe the events yourself, but learned about them through at least one 
other person’s cognitive filters). Secondly, gossip is much easier to fake (because 
people lie) than information gained from observing behaviour directly, in par-
ticular when honest (difficult-to-fake) signals are being displayed (e.g., visual 
cues of health). So, comparing the different “channels,” direct (D), indirect (I), 
and reported (R) reputation, in terms of value (e.g., reliability and accuracy), it 
is plausible that D > I > R. 
Also, we should remember that our social impressions will be riddled with 
inaccuracies — a social version of the inaccuracies uncovered in decision theory 
(cf. Ayton, 2010). Furthermore, the social impression is likely highly distorted 
by emotional processing. As Schino and Aureli (2009) argue, cooperative be-
haviour amongst animals is likely mediated by a kind of “emotional bookkeep-
ing” (rather than a rational and cognitive bookkeeping). This is likely in humans 
too (McElreath et al., 2003), because people generally are not rational actors 
maximizing their benefits without emotion (Gigerenzer, 1997; Simon, 1955, 
1983; So ber and Wilson, 1998; Sutherland, 1992). Binmore (2005) proffered 
that emo tion “evolved to help police primeval social contracts, and they 
remain useful to us for this purpose” (p. 83). A behaviourist interpretation of 
emotional bookkeeping is that organisms are motivated by emotional rewards 
and punishments that get associated with specific interactions with particular 
individuals (see discussion in Sober and Wilson, 1998, pp. 256–260). To me, 
this sounds like the basis for acknowledging at least a rudimentary form of 
social expertise in animals (cf. Helton, 2005), applicable to the concepts of 
reputation and reciprocity, direct and in direct. 
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